Does it make security sense to hash password on client end
If you were to hash a user's password prior to sending it across the line and leaving it in plain-text in memory, would this improve the security of the application?
I would assume this mitigates a small fraction of vulnerabilities by protecting the data stored in the clients memory. But really if we're worried about someone reading the client's memory there are probably bigger problems that we can't address.
There's something that doesn't feel right about hashing on the client's end.
Is password hashing on the client end a common practice? Are there any other advantages or disadvantages to doing it?
EDIT: Given the communication channel is secure (SSL). Under what conditions would it be acceptable and worthwhile to use such an approach. I'm asking this because it was suggested by a "security professional" that I use such a scheme during some application functions.
No.
When the client sends something, whether it is P or H(P) or H(H(P)) anyone who intercepts this can simply resend the exact same thing, thus making any function like this equivalent to using the password directly.
That's why you should use a nonce; The server can give out some random garbage k and the client will calculate H(P,k) and send it to the server. HMAC is a popular implementation of this method.
Provided the server never accepts the same nonce twice, this is secure against a replay attack.
The hash is identical to the password from a security POV in the scenario you describe: if I intercept the hash, I don't need to know the password, I can just send the server the hash I intercepted.
Authentication protocols go to some length to avoid this problem; security is hard, and you are best off selecting and implementing a well-understood protocol rather than rolling your own.
If your traffic is going over SSL, you're safe from interception and hashing gives you little extra benefit.
Sending a hashed password won't improve security on your site, as others have pointed out (since you accept a hashed password, all the bad guy needs to know is the hashed version). It's also not really secure, since the bad guy can presumably load your login page and examine the Javascript or Java deployed.
What it does do is prevents somebody watching the packets from being able to pull out a password, and that is moderately useful. Many people use the same password on multiple sites (I do it for all but the higher security sites), and therefore if you can get one password from them you can log into other accounts on other sites.
It also prevents the real password from being stored, even temporarily, on your site, and that may provide a little extra security if your site is compromised.
So, while I'd consider user-side hashing to be potentially a good things, it isn't worth going to much extra trouble.
And, as others have told you, don't roll your own security. There's far too many things that can go wrong. You won't notice them nearly as fast as a practiced bad guy will.
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